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A FIXTURE ON A CHANGING COURT: JUSTICE
STEVENS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Erwin Chemerinsky
ABSTRACT—Throughout his time on the Supreme Court, Justice John Paul
Stevens consistently took the “strict separationist” approach to the
Establishment Clause. This led him to write and join opinions that stated
that the Establishment Clause is violated by religious activity in public
schools, by religious symbols on government property, and by government
support for parochial schools that could be used for religious education.
Justice Stevens adhered to these views throughout his thirty-five years on
the Court. Although the strict separationist approach was the dominant view
on the Court for several decades, those appointed after Justice Stevens
rarely held this view. Some, like Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and
Stephen Breyer, believe that the government violates the Establishment
Clause only if it symbolically endorses religion or a particular religion.
Others, like Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence
Thomas, believe that little violates the Establishment Clause: the
government acts unconstitutionally only if it literally establishes a church or
coerces religious participation. The result is that, while Justice Stevens
remained consistent, the Justices around him became much more
conservative on this issue. Justice Stevens’s approach to the Establishment
Clause has great virtues in protecting freedom of conscience and providing
inclusiveness in a religiously pluralistic society.
AUTHOR—Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of
California, Irvine School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
In March 2005, I argued Van Orden v. Perry1 before the Supreme
Court. The case involved the constitutionality of a six-foot high, three-foot
wide monument of the Ten Commandments that sits exactly at the corner
between the Texas State Capitol and the Texas Supreme Court.2 As I
prepared for the oral argument, I knew that Justice John Paul Stevens would
likely vote to declare the monument unconstitutional as violating the
Establishment Clause. Throughout his time on the Supreme Court, Justice
Stevens had been a consistent vote and voice for a wall separating church
and state. I also knew that, no matter what, Justice Stevens would treat
every advocate with decency and respect. Although he had a laser-like
ability to get to the heart of the case and ask the most difficult questions, he
always did so without rancor or sarcasm and in the best possible tone of
intellectual engagement.
The argument went as I expected, but the ultimate result surprised me.
The Court voted 5–4 to uphold the monument, which I certainly regarded as
possible, but with Justice Breyer concurring in the judgment and providing
the critical fifth vote.3 As I, and everyone, predicted, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas voted to uphold the
monument.
Had the case been argued when Justice Stevens came on the bench in
1975, I have no doubt that it would have come out the other way. At that
time, a majority of the Court continued to believe in the strict separation of
church and state. It was just four years after the Court decided Lemon v.
Kurtzman,4 which has been described as embodying this strict separationist
approach to the Establishment Clause.5 On the other hand, if the case were
argued today, I think I would have little chance of prevailing. The
1

545 U.S. 677 (2005) (permitting Ten Commandments display at the Texas State Capitol).
Id. at 681.
3
Id. at 681, 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
4
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
5
See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 236–
37 (1994) (describing strict separation as the dominant theory of the Establishment Clause until 1980).
2
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replacement of Justice O’Connor with Justice Alito means that there now
are five Justices who are likely to find that little violates the Establishment
Clause.6
Justice Stevens came on to the Court as a moderate Republican and
was perceived as a moderate justice, but by the time he retired he was
perceived as a strong liberal voice.7 Upon his retirement, there was much
discussion as to whether Justice Stevens changed over his thirty-five years
on the Supreme Court or whether the Court changed around him.
Undoubtedly, it was some of both. In some areas, such as affirmative
action, Justice Stevens changed over time.8 But in the area of the
Establishment Clause, it was not Justice Stevens who changed, but the
Justices around him. From the time he came on to the Court, Justice Stevens
always voted to enforce a strict separation of church and state. This was the
majority view when he arrived as a Justice and the dissenting view when he
retired.
This Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes Justice Stevens’s
strict separationist approach to the Establishment Clause. Part II explains
how the Court shifted during Justice Stevens’s tenure there. Finally, Part III
briefly argues that Justice Stevens’s interpretation of the Establishment
Clause was right and expresses hope that someday the Court will return to
his views on the important and recurring issue of how the Establishment
Clause should be interpreted.
I. JUSTICE STEVENS AS A STRICT SEPARATIONIST
The strict separationist approach to the Establishment Clause holds
that, to the greatest extent possible, government and religion should be
separated. Government should be, as much as possible, secular; religion
should be entirely in the private realm of society. This theory is perhaps
best described by Thomas Jefferson’s metaphor that there should be a wall
separating church and state.9 As the Supreme Court declared in Everson v.
6

There have been two Establishment Clause cases during the Roberts Court Era and both have
ruled in favor of the government by 5–4 margins. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S.
Ct. 1436 (2011) (rejecting taxpayer standing to challenge a tax credit program that benefited religious
schools); Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (reversing lower court decision that held a large
cross in the Mojave Desert violated the Establishment Clause).
7
See Robert Barnes, Justice Stevens to Step Down, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2010, at A1; Jeffrey
Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 23, 2007, at 50.
8
Compare City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 475, 485–86 (1989) (invalidating an
affirmative action program with Justice Stevens in the majority), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 311, 343–44 (2003) (upholding an affirmative action program with Justice Stevens in the majority).
9
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge and Others, a Committee of the
Danbury Baptist Association, in the State of Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802), in THOMAS JEFFERSON,
WRITINGS 510, 510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (“I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of
the whole American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation
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Board of Education: “The First Amendment has erected a wall between
church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable.”10
Justice Brennan articulated the justifications for this approach when he
wrote:
The first, which is most closely related to the more general conceptions of
liberty found in the remainder of the First Amendment, is to guarantee the
individual right to conscience. . . .
....
The second purpose of separation and neutrality is to keep the state from
interfering in the essential autonomy of religious life, either by taking upon
itself the decision of religious issues, or by unduly involving itself in the
supervision of religious institutions or officials.
The third purpose of separation and neutrality is to prevent the trivialization
and degradation of religion by too close an attachment to the organs of
government. . . .
Finally, the principles of separation and neutrality help assure that essentially
religious issues, precisely because of their importance and sensitivity, not
become the occasion for battle in the political arena.11

In every case, Justice Stevens adhered to the strict separationist
approach.12 Interestingly, he wrote relatively few majority opinions, but was
a consistent vote in the many Establishment Clause cases during his long
tenure on the Supreme Court. To be more specific, there were three key
tenets to Justice Stevens’s approach to the Establishment Clause. He
consistently voted and expressed the views that the Establishment Clause is
violated by religious activities in public schools, by religious symbols on
government property, and by government aid to parochial schools that can
be used for religious education.
A. Religious Activities in Public Schools
First, Justice Stevens espoused the belief that government-sponsored
religious activities in public schools violate the Establishment Clause. Thus,
in Stone v. Graham, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion with
Justice Stevens in the majority, declared unconstitutional a state law that
required the Ten Commandments to be posted on the walls of every public

between church and State.”).
10
330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
11
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 803–05 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
12
One possible exception to this is Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, where Justice
Stevens wrote the majority opinion dismissing a challenge to the words “under God” in the Pledge of
Allegiance as violating the Establishment Clause in public schools. 542 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2004). The Court
dismissed the challenge, however, for lack of standing. Id.
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school classroom.13 The Court concluded that the law “had no secular
legislative purpose” and therefore violated the Establishment Clause.14
Similarly, in Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court invalidated a state law that
authorized public school teachers to hold a one-minute period of silence for
meditation or voluntary prayer.15 Justice Stevens wrote for the majority and
concluded that the purpose behind the law was to reintroduce prayer into
public schools and deemed the law unconstitutional because it “was not
motivated by any clearly secular purpose—indeed, the statute had no
secular purpose.”16
In Edwards v. Aguillard, the Court followed this reasoning and ruled
unconstitutional a state law that required that public schools that teach
evolution also teach “creation science.”17 The Court explained that “creation
science” is a religious theory explaining the origin of human life, and
concluded: “[B]ecause the primary purpose of the Creationism Act is to
endorse a particular religious doctrine, the Act furthers religion in violation
of the Establishment Clause.”18 Justice Stevens joined the majority opinion
written by Justice Brennan.
In Lee v. Weisman, the Court declared unconstitutional clergydelivered prayers at public school graduations.19 Justice Kennedy, writing
for the Court, held that such prayers are inherently coercive because there is
great pressure on students to attend their graduation ceremonies and not to
leave during the prayers.20
Justice Stevens also joined Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion that
emphasized that the Establishment Clause can be violated even without
coercion. Justice Blackmun remarked that “it is not enough that the
government restrain from compelling religious practices[;] [i]t must not
engage in them either.”21 Justice Stevens joined Justice Souter’s concurring
opinion as well. That opinion stressed that coercion is sufficient for a
finding of an Establishment Clause violation, but it is not necessary;
Establishment Clause violations exist without coercion if there is symbolic
government endorsement of religion.22

13

449 U.S. 39, 41, 42–43 (1980) (per curiam).
Id. at 41.
15
472 U.S. 38, 40, 61 (1985).
16
Id. at 56.
17
482 U.S. 578, 582 (1987).
18
Id. at 593–94.
19
505 U.S. 577, 580–81 (1992); id. at 599 (“The sole question presented is whether a religious
exercise may be conducted at a graduation ceremony in circumstances where . . . young graduates who
object are induced to conform.”).
20
Id. at 593. Justice Stevens joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion, though he also joined Justice
Blackmun’s concurring opinion.
21
Id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
22
Id. at 618–19 (Souter, J., concurring).
14
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Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Doe, which held that student-delivered prayers at high
school football games violated the Establishment Clause.23 A public high
school in Texas had a tradition of having a student deliver a prayer before
varsity football games. The school claimed that the student prayers were
private speech but the Court emphatically disagreed. Justice Stevens
explained: “[W]e are not persuaded that the pregame invocations should be
regarded as ‘private speech.’ These invocations are authorized by a
government policy and take place on government property at governmentsponsored school-related events.”24 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court,
emphasized that the school had encouraged and facilitated the prayer at an
official school event.25 The Court noted that the school encouraged the
delivery of prayers, both in its official policies and in its traditional support
for prayer at football games.26 The result was both actual and likely
perceived government endorsement of religion.
Justice Stevens also noted the coercive aspect of the school’s policy:
many students—football players, band members, and cheerleaders—were
required to be present in order to receive academic credit.27 He wrote that
forcing students to choose between attending the game and avoiding
religion itself violated the Establishment Clause:
The Constitution, moreover, demands that the school may not force this
difficult choice upon these students for “[i]t is a tenet of the First Amendment
that the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and
benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious
practice.”28

It is notable that Justice Stevens’s majority opinion avoided choosing
among the theories of the Establishment Clause; he explained why the
prayers failed scrutiny under any of the leading tests.29 Justice Stevens
obviously was aware that there was no consensus among the Justices as to
the appropriate theory of the Establishment Clause, so he wrote the opinion
in a manner that explained the result under each of the major approaches to
the provision.
B. Religious Symbols on Government Property
Second, Justice Stevens consistently voted to find that religious
symbols on government property violate the Establishment Clause. In
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
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530 U.S. 290, 315–17 (2000).
Id. at 302.
See id. at 297–98, 302.
Id. at 309.
See id. at 311–12.
Id. at 312 (alteration in original) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)).
Id. at 310–17.
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Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice Stevens dissented from a decision that upheld the
constitutionality of a municipal-sponsored nativity scene in a park.30 Justice
Stevens joined two dissenting opinions, one by Justice Brennan and one by
Justice Blackmun.31
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a nativity scene put in a stairway display case of a
county courthouse and of a menorah placed in front of a city building.32 The
Court ruled 6–3 that the menorah was constitutional, but 5–4 that the
nativity scene was unconstitutional. Justice Stevens, together with Justices
Brennan and Marshall, concluded that both symbols on government
property violated the Establishment Clause.33 Four of the Justices—Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy—would have
upheld both symbols.34 The key to the outcome was that Justices Blackmun
and O’Connor saw the nativity scene as violating the Establishment Clause
because the display of a religious symbol of only one religion on
government property was an impermissible symbolic endorsement, while
they allowed the menorah because it was part of an overall holiday
display.35
In Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, Justice Stevens
wrote a powerful dissent to a decision that upheld the Ku Klux Klan’s
placing of a large Latin cross in a public park across from the Ohio State
Capitol.36 The Supreme Court, without a majority opinion, held that the
state government’s attempt to exclude the cross was unconstitutional
discrimination against religious speech.37 Justice Scalia wrote the plurality
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice
Thomas. He emphasized that the First Amendment’s protection of speech
includes religious expression and concluded that excluding the cross was
impermissible content-based discrimination.38 Justice O’Connor concurred
in part and concurred in the judgment, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer.
Justice O’Connor wrote that the key question was whether allowing the
30

465 U.S. 668, 726 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also id. at 695 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“The Court’s decision implicitly leaves open questions concerning the constitutionality of the public
display on public property of a crèche standing alone, or the public display of other distinctively
religious symbols such as a cross.” (emphasis added)). But see id. at 671 (majority opinion) (“The
display [was] situated in a park owned by a nonprofit organization and located in the heart of the
shopping district.”).
31
Id. at 694–95 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 726 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
32
492 U.S. 573, 578 (1989).
33
Id. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
34
Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
35
Id. at 620–21 (Blackmun, J.); id. at 627, 635–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
36
515 U.S. 753, 797 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37
Id. at 760–63 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion).
38
Id.
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cross would be perceived, by the reasonable observer, as government
symbolic endorsement of religion.39
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented. Justice Stevens, in his
dissent, argued for a strong presumption against allowing such religious
symbols on government property.40 He also criticized Justice O’Connor’s
focus on the reasonable observer and said that the Establishment Clause
was violated because “[t]he ‘reasonable observer’ of any symbol placed
unattended in front of any capitol in the world will normally assume that the
sovereign—which is not only the owner of that parcel of real estate but also
the lawgiver for the surrounding territory—has sponsored and facilitated its
message.”41
Pinette is illustrative because it reveals the divisions on the Court
regarding the Establishment Clause. Justice Scalia and the plurality do not
see a constitutional problem with religious symbols on government
property, so they saw the exclusion of the cross as a content-based
restriction of speech. Justice O’Connor focused on whether the religious
symbol was a government endorsement of religion. But Justice Stevens saw
all religious symbols on government property as an affront to the
Establishment Clause and used his dissent in Pinette to reject the Court’s
movement towards a symbolic endorsement test.
In 2005, the Court considered two cases concerning Ten
Commandments displays on government property: McCreary County v.
ACLU42 and Van Orden v. Perry.43 In McCreary County, the Court, in a 5–4
decision, ruled that Ten Commandments displays in Kentucky county
courthouses were unconstitutional because the government had the
impermissible purpose of advancing religion.44 The counties were clear that
they wanted the Ten Commandments posted because of the religious
content and significance of the Decalogue.45 Justice Stevens joined Justice
Souter’s majority opinion holding this unconstitutional.
As discussed in the Introduction above, in Van Orden, the Court, in a
5–4 decision without a majority opinion, upheld the constitutionality of a
six-foot high, three-foot wide Ten Commandments monument that sits
between the Texas State Capitol and the Texas Supreme Court.46 Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote a plurality opinion joined by Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas and declared that a government may place religious

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
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Id. at 773 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 799–802 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 801–02.
545 U.S. 844 (2005).
545 U.S. 677 (2005).
545 U.S. at 868–70.
Id. at 870.
545 U.S. at 681, 691–92.
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symbols on government property.47 Justice Breyer concurred in the
judgment and stressed that the presence of the monument for over forty
years, the surrounding secular displays and monuments, and the fact that the
monument was donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles all convinced him
that the state government was not impermissibly symbolically endorsing
religion.48
Justice Stevens wrote a powerful dissenting opinion: “In my judgment,
at the very least, the Establishment Clause has created a strong presumption
against the display of religious symbols on public property.”49 He wrote: “If
any fragment of Jefferson’s metaphorical ‘wall of separation between
church and State’ is to be preserved—if there remains any meaning to the
‘wholesome “neutrality” of which this Court’s [Establishment Clause] cases
speak’—a negative answer to that question [of whether the monument is
allowed] is mandatory.”50
Justice Stevens concluded his dissenting opinion by declaring:
The judgment of the Court in this case stands for the proposition that the
Constitution permits governmental displays of sacred religious texts. This
makes a mockery of the constitutional ideal that government must remain
neutral between religion and irreligion. If a State may endorse a particular
deity’s command to “have no other gods before me,” it is difficult to conceive
of any textual display that would run afoul of the Establishment Clause.51

Justice Stevens’s last opinion in an Establishment Clause case was also
a dissent. In Salazar v. Buono, the Court, in a 5–4 decision without a
majority opinion, reversed a Ninth Circuit decision that held a large cross in
a federal park in the Mojave Desert as violative of the Establishment
Clause.52 After a federal district court and the Ninth Circuit held the cross to
be unconstitutional, Congress passed a law transferring ownership of the
small parcel of land where the cross is located to a private veterans’ group.53
The district court concluded that this was a sham transfer, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed.54 Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the Court in
an opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Justice
Kennedy held that the lower courts had not adequately considered whether
the federal statute transferring ownership was a basis for modifying the
injunction to remove the cross.55 Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in
the judgment and would have concluded that no one had standing to
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Id. at 691–92.
Id. at 701–02 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 708 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (first alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
Id. at 735.
130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (2010).
Id. at 1813.
Id. at 1814.
Id. at 1819–20.
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challenge the cross on government property.56
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Sotomayor. He explained:
“The Establishment Clause, if nothing else, prohibits government from
‘specifying details upon which men and women who believe in a benevolent,
omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ.’” A Latin cross
necessarily symbolizes one of the most important tenets upon which believers
in a benevolent Creator, as well as nonbelievers, are known to differ. In my
view, the District Court was right to enforce its prior judgment by enjoining
Congress’ proposed remedy—a remedy that was engineered to leave the cross
intact and that did not alter its basic meaning. I certainly agree that the Nation
should memorialize the service of those who fought and died in World War I,
but it cannot lawfully do so by continued endorsement of a starkly sectarian
message.57

Over the last thirty-five years, the Supreme Court has become
increasingly willing to allow religious symbols on government property.
Justice Stevens, however, was consistent throughout his time on the Court
in believing that religious symbols on government property violate the
Establishment Clause.
C. Government Aid to Parochial Schools
Third and finally, Justice Stevens believed that government aid to
parochial schools should be limited and that the government should not be
able to provide aid to parochial schools that could be used for religious
instruction. The shift in the Court on this issue during Justice Stevens’s
tenure is clearly evidenced in the Court’s decisions in Aguilar v. Felton58
and Agostini v. Felton.59 In Aguilar, Justice Stevens joined Justice
Brennan’s majority opinion, which held that it violates the Establishment
Clause for a government to send remedial education teachers on to
parochial school premises to provide instruction.60 But twelve years later, in
Agostini, a 5–4 decision in which Justice Stevens joined Justice Souter’s
dissenting opinion, the Court overruled Aguilar and eliminated the rigid
rule preventing government subsidies of teachers in religious schools.61
In Mitchell v. Helms, another case indicative of the Court’s shift in
views as to the Establishment Clause, the Court held that the government
could give instructional equipment to parochial schools so long as it was
56

Id. at 1824–25 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,
718 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting))).
58
473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
59
521 U.S. 203 (1997).
60
473 U.S. at 404–06, 414.
61
521 U.S. at 208–09, 240.
57
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not used in religious education.62 Earlier, in Meek v. Pittenger, the Court
declared unconstitutional a state law that provided instructional materials,
including “maps, charts, and laboratory equipment” to parochial schools.63
But in Mitchell, the Court expressly overruled Meek.64
Mitchell involved Louisiana’s providing instructional equipment,
including “computers, and computer software, and also slide and movie
projectors, overhead projectors, television sets, tape recorders, VCR’s,
projection screens, laboratory equipment, maps, globes, filmstrips, slides,
and cassette recordings” to parochial schools.65 Justice Thomas, writing for
a plurality of four, said that the aid should be allowed because it is provided
equally to all schools, religious and nonreligious.66 Justice Thomas
emphatically rejected the view that a government cannot give aid that is
actually used for religious education. He also sharply criticized the
traditional law preventing the government from giving aid to “pervasively
sectarian” institutions.67 He said that this phrase was born of anti-Catholic
bigotry and wrote that “hostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has
a shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow.”68
Justice O’Connor wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined
by Justice Breyer, in which she sharply disagreed with Justice Thomas’s
approach. Justice O’Connor said that equality never had been the sole
measure of whether government action violated the Establishment Clause:
“[W]e have never held that a government-aid program passes constitutional
muster solely because of the neutral criteria it employs as a basis for
distributing aid.”69 She continued: “I also disagree with the plurality’s
conclusion that actual diversion of government aid to religious
indoctrination is consistent with the Establishment Clause.”70 Justice
O’Connor wrote that the test should be whether aid actually is used for
religious instruction, in which case the Establishment Clause is violated.71
Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg, urged the Court to adhere to its precedents and find that aid is
impermissible when it is of a type, like instructional materials, that can be
used for religious education. Justice Souter began by observing:
The establishment prohibition of government religious funding serves more
than one end. It is meant to guarantee the right of individual conscience against
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

530 U.S. 793, 829–32 (2000) (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion).
421 U.S. 349, 365–66 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
530 U.S. at 808 (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 803.
Id. at 829–32.
Id. at 828.
Id.
Id. at 837–39 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 840.
Id. at 837–38, 845–44.
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compulsion, to protect the integrity of religion against the corrosion of secular
support, and to preserve the unity of political society against the implied
exclusion of the less favored and the antagonism of controversy over public
support for religious causes.72

He strongly disagreed with the plurality’s view that equality is the sole
test for a violation of the Establishment Clause and identified a number of
factors that prior cases require to be considered in determining whether aid
is impermissible.
Although Justice Stevens did not write this dissent, it was consistent
with the position that he had taken throughout his time on the Supreme
Court concerning limits on government aid to parochial schools and, more
generally, on the need for a wall separating church and state.
Indeed, it is striking that throughout his time on the Court, Justice
Stevens was consistent in adhering to a strict separationist approach to the
Establishment Clause. He always voted that the Establishment Clause is
violated by religious activities in public schools, by religious symbols on
government property, and by government aid to parochial schools.
II. THE SHIFTING COURT
From 1975, when Justice Stevens joined the Court, until 2010, when he
retired, the Court’s views on the Establishment Clause changed greatly. In
1947, when the Court held in Everson v. Board of Education that the
Establishment Clause applied to the states, all nine Justices expressed belief
in the idea of a strict separation of church and state and the wall of
separation articulated by Thomas Jefferson.73 As Professor Ira Lupu has
persuasively explained, this was the dominant theory of the Establishment
Clause from 1947 until 1980.74 With Justice O’Connor’s arrival and her
opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, an alternative theory developed: A
government violates the Establishment Clause only if it symbolically
endorses religion or a particular religion.75 Justice Scalia’s arrival
introduced a forceful voice for rejecting any notion of a wall separating
church and state and finding that the government violates the Establishment
Clause only if it literally establishes a church or coerces religious
participation.76
Thus, in 1989, when the Court decided County of Allegheny v. ACLU,77
the Justices were divided among these three views. Three Justices—Justices
72

Id. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
74
See Lupu, supra note 5.
75
465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). For an early criticism of this approach, see William P. Marshall, “We
Know It when We See It”: The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986).
76
See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640–42 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
73
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Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens—took the strict separationist view. Two
Justices—Justices Blackmun and O’Connor—used the symbolic
endorsement test. Four Justices—Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
White, Scalia, and Kennedy—took the accommodationist approach. This
explained the 4–2–3 split on the Court as to the constitutionality of two
religious symbols on government property that it considered.
Two years later, Justice Clarence Thomas replaced Justice Thurgood
Marshall, providing a fifth vote for the accommodationist approach.
However, in Lee v. Weisman, in 1992, the Court failed to produce a
majority opinion for this view of the Establishment Clause, although five of
the Justices took this approach.78 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter, found that clergy-delivered
prayers at public school graduations violated the Establishment Clause.79
Although Justice Kennedy focused on the inherently coercive nature of the
prayers, the other Justices in the majority joined separate concurring
opinions, stating that an Establishment Clause violation could exist even
without a finding of coercion.80
In 1993, Justice Ginsburg, a strict separationist, replaced Justice Byron
White, who had always taken the accommodationist approach.81 In 1994,
Justice Breyer, who has taken the symbolic endorsement approach, replaced
Justice Blackmun, who also took this approach.82 Thus, in 2000, when
Mitchell v. Helms came before the Court, it was not surprising that the
Court split 4–2–383 as it had in County of Allegheny. Justice Thomas, joined
by the other accommodationists—Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia,
and Justice Kennedy—voted to allow government aid to parochial schools
to be used for religious education.84 Justices O’Connor and Breyer would
have allowed the state government to give instructional equipment to
parochial schools so long as the equipment was not used in religious
instruction.85 Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter dissented and would
78

See 505 U.S. at 577.
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Compare id. at 599 (“No holding by this Court suggests that a school can persuade or compel a
student to participate in a religious exercise.”), with id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“It is not
enough that the government restrain from compelling religious practices: It must not engage in them
either. The Court repeatedly has recognized that a violation of the Establishment Clause is not
predicated on coercion.” (citation omitted)), and id. at 618 (Souter, J., concurring) (“Over the years, this
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Id. at 836–37 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
79

599

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

have adhered to prior decisions holding that such instructional equipment is
not allowed because it could be used for religious instruction.86
The departures of Chief Justice Rehnquist in 2005 and Justice
O’Connor in 2006 moved the Court further to the right, both on the
Establishment Clause and more generally. Chief Justice John Roberts,
replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist, did not alter the Court’s ideology; it is
hard to identify any case where Chief Justice Roberts voted differently from
how Chief Justice Rehnquist likely would have voted. But Justice Alito
replacing Justice O’Connor is crucial on a host of issues, including the
Establishment Clause. There are likely now five votes for the
accommodationist position that Justice Scalia long has championed87 and
that Justice Stevens vehemently rejected. The simple reality is that Justice
Stevens remained consistent in views of the Establishment Clause over his
thirty-five-year tenure on the Court, but the Justices around him changed
and moved the Court significantly further to the right and away from
viewing the Establishment Clause as creating a wall separating church and
state.
III. JUSTICE STEVENS WAS RIGHT
Obviously, this Essay does not allow space for a full development of a
defense of Justice Stevens’s view that the Establishment Clause provides a
wall that separates church and state. But I would be remiss if I were purely
descriptive and did not attempt to briefly defend his position.
There are many reasons why separating church and state is so vital.
First, the Establishment Clause protects freedom of conscience by ensuring
that the government is not aligned with a particular religion, or even with
religion generally. A government identified with a specific faith inevitably
causes people to feel pressure, sometimes subtle and sometimes overt, to
conform their religious beliefs and practices.
Separating church and state means that people will not be not be taxed
to support religions other than their own. The famous statement of Thomas
Jefferson concerning the need for a wall separating church and state, and
James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, were made in the context of opposing a state tax to aid the
church.88 It is wrong to make me support a church that teaches that my
religion or my beliefs are wrong or even evil. It violates my freedom of
conscience to force me to support religions that I do not accept. Justice
Souter explained that “compelling an individual to support religion violates
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the fundamental principle of freedom of conscience. Madison’s and
Jefferson’s now familiar words establish clearly that liberty of personal
conviction requires freedom from coercion to support religion, and this
means that the government can compel no aid to fund it.”89
Second, the Establishment Clause serves a fundamental purpose of
inclusion in that it allows all in society, those of every religion and those of
no religion, to feel tied to a representative government. When government
practices support religion, inescapably those of different religions feel
excluded. When a government is overtly aligned with religion, those of
different faiths, or those who do not identify with particular beliefs,
inevitably feel that they are in the wrong place—that they are outsiders with
regard to their government.
Treating all religions equally does not solve this. In a society that is
overwhelmingly Christian, those of minority faiths feel marginalized and
unwelcome when religion is overtly a part of government practice. If
treating all religions equally were the only constraint imposed by the
Establishment Clause, a school could begin each day with a prayer so long
as every religion got its due. If a school reflected America’s religious
diversity, the vast majority of days would begin with Christian prayers.
Those with no religion would be made to feel that it was not their school, as
would those of minority religions who routinely were subjected to prayers
of Christian faiths.
This goal of inclusion is central, not incidental, to the Establishment
Clause. Justice O’Connor has explained: “Direct government action
endorsing religion or a particular religious practice is invalid . . . because it
‘sends a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members
of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of the political community.’”90
Consider the most blatant violation of the Establishment Clause: A city
or state declares a particular religion, say Catholicism, to be the official
religion. Assuming that the government took no additional actions to limit
free exercise by those of other faiths, why is such a declaration
unacceptable? The pronouncement that there is an official religion makes
all of a different faith feel unwelcome. They are made to feel that they are
tolerated guests, not equal members of the community. Just as bad, those of
the favored religion are made to feel that they are special members of the
community. In Justice O’Connor’s words, non-adherents are made to feel
like outsiders and adherents are made to feel like insiders.
The very core of the Establishment Clause prevents government
actions that divide people in this way. The Establishment Clause is about
preventing the majority, through government power, from making members
89
90
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of other religions feel unwelcome. The Establishment Clause does not
prevent people from praying; it merely prevents the infusion of religion in
government events and on government property. People, of course, have the
right to pray and listen to prayers, but not at an official government
function, especially one where the audience is compelled to be present.
The problem is much more significant than it was when the First
Amendment was adopted because the country is far more religiously
diverse in the twenty-first century than it was in 1791. Justice Brennan
observed:
[O]ur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than were
our forefathers. They knew differences chiefly among Protestant sects. Today
the Nation is far more heterogeneous religiously, including as it does
substantial minorities not only of Catholics and Jews but as well of those who
worship according to no version of the Bible and those who worship no God at
all.91

This explains why religious symbols do not belong on government
property. A city hall with a large cross on its roof makes those of different
religions feel unwelcome, or feel that it is not their government. At the oral
argument in Van Orden v. Perry,92 Justice Kennedy asked me why those
who do not like the Ten Commandments monument at the seat of the Texas
state government cannot simply avert their eyes. My response was that this
has no stopping point—a city could put a large Latin cross atop its roof, or
many crosses, and simply proclaim that those who do not like it should
avert their eyes. Not looking does not make the constitutional problem go
away. A cross atop city hall violates the Establishment Clause even if
people remember to avert their eyes.
This, of course, is only a partial defense of a wall separating church
and state. But it explains why I believe that Justice Stevens was correct and
why I hope that someday his view will again be accepted by a majority of
the Court.
CONCLUSION
Much is written in this symposium about Justice Stevens’s views of the
Constitution and his approach to specific issues. In this Essay, I have
focused on one particular topic: his views about the Establishment Clause.
But one crucial aspect of what he brought to the Court must not be
overlooked: his tremendous decency. It is reflected in how he treated every
lawyer who appeared before him. It is reflected in the way in which he
interacted with his colleagues on the bench, never displaying the slightest
91
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anger or rancor, no matter how much he disagreed or even was provoked. It
is reflected in his opinions, which never resorted to the sarcasm or ridicule
that has become all too prevalent in recent years.
At a time in which in our nation seems so bitterly divided and nasty
rhetoric is present everywhere, including in Supreme Court opinions,
Justice Stevens is truly a role model for all of us.

603

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

604

